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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellee/Plaintiff Ida K. Daniels ("Mrs. Daniels"), widow 
of Charles P. Daniels ("Mr. Daniels"), sued her husband's 
former employer, Thomas & Betts Corporation ("T&B"), for 
breach of fiduciary duty, delay in providing ERISA plan 
documents, and attorney's fees. She alleged inter alia that 
T&B materially misled Mr. Daniels into believing that he 
had 1.5 times his annual salary in supplemental life 
insurance in addition to the one times annual salary life 
insurance T&B provided Mr. Daniels as an employment 
benefit. 
 
The District Court granted Mrs. Daniels' motion for 
summary judgment as to liability on the breach of fiduciary 
duty claim. It further held, however, that there were 
genuine issues of material fact as to the type of equitable 
relief that should be awarded as a result of that breach. 
The District Court also granted Mrs. Daniels summary 
judgment on her claim that T&B failed for 291 days to 
provide her plan documents in violation of S 104(b)(4) of 
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ERISA, 29 U.S.C. S 1024(b)(4). It awarded her the maximum 
statutory penalty of $100 per day, or $29,100. 
 
The District Court referred the determination of equitable 
relief on the breach of fiduciary duty claim to an arbitrator 
who subsequently awarded Mrs. Daniels $40,545. 
Thereafter, the District Court approved an attorney's fees 
award of $34,482.28 and entered final judgment in the 
amount of $104,127.28, plus interest and taxable costs. 
T&B appeals. We will reverse the judgment of the District 
Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
I. 
 
Mr. Daniels worked for T&B from 1955 until his death 
from cancer in 1993. Prior to 1993, Mr. Daniels received life 
insurance in the amount of one times his annual salary at 
T&B's expense as an employment benefit. Also prior to 
1993, Mr. Daniels elected to supplement this insurance by 
purchasing group life insurance having a face value of 1.5 
times his annual salary. The premiums for this 
supplemental insurance were the same without regard to 
the employee's age and were deducted from the employee's 
paycheck. 
 
T&B changed its insurance carrier and, concomitantly, 
the structure of its life insurance benefits, effective 
January, 1993. Under the new plan (the "MetLife plan"), 
T&B continued to provide at its expense life insurance in 
the amount of one times annual salary as an employment 
benefit. Employees could continue to purchase 
supplemental life insurance, but now only in whole (rather 
than fractional) multiples of salary. Moreover, the 
premiums for this supplemental coverage were "age- 
banded" so that they increased with the employee's age. 
 
In the fall of 1992, Mr. Daniels became ill and took a 
medical leave from T&B. In early December, T&B sent Mr. 
Daniels a number of documents explaining the life 
insurance benefits changes that would become effective on 
January 1, 1993. The information packet began with a 
memorandum from John Schierer, T&B's Manager of 
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Employee Relations, to "ALL OFFICE EMPLOYEES." With 
regard to life insurance, the memo stated that: 
 
       Life Insurance Maximums will be increased to a 
       maximum of five times base salary on [sic] $500,000 
       whichever is less. Thomas & Betts will continue to 
       provide one times base salary free of charge. Additional 
       multiples will be available on an age-banded basis. 
       Details are attached. 
 
The first attached document is entitled, "OPEN 
ENROLLMENT / GROUP TERM LIFE INSURANCE / 
EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1993." The document again 
explains that T&B "will provide salaried employees one 
times their base salary in group term life insurance to a 
maximum $500,000." The document then sets forth the 
following two paragraphs which give rise to this suit: 
 
       If you currently have supplemental coverage, you will 
       be grandfathered up to your current amount. If your 
       current coverage amount is less than 5 times base 
       salary, you then have the option of electing an 
       additional 1 times base salary up to an incremental 
       $100,000 without additional proof of insurability. 
 
       Employees who do not currently have supplemental 
       coverage will be guaranteed coverage for 2 times base 
       salary up to $200,000. Proof of insurability will be 
       required for the additional coverage chosen in excess of 
       2 times. 
 
An additional document, entitled "LIFE INSURANCE," 
further explains T&B's employees' supplemental life 
insurance benefits as follows: 
 
        In addition to your Basic Life Insurance, you may 
       purchase Supplemental Life Insurance by enrolling in 
       the program and paying the required premium. 
 
       Amount of Coverage 
 
        You may purchase Supplemental Life Insurance in 
       amounts of one, two, three, four or five times your base 
       salary. 
 
On December 20, 1992, Mr. Daniels met with Schierer. 
Mr. Daniels asked a number of questions about his 
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benefits, none of which related to supplemental life 
insurance. In the context of his health care benefits, Mr. 
Daniels expressed an interest in increasing his take-home 
pay in light of the layoff T&B had warned him he would 
soon face. At some point during the conference, Mr. Daniels 
executed a "Group Insurance Enrollment/Change Form." 
The form provided an option for "Your Supplemental Life 
Insurance" and stated, "I wish to purchase Supplemental 
Life Insurance in the amount indicated below.*" The 
possible choices were "None," "1 time,""2 times," "3 times," 
"4 times," and "5 times my annual earnings." The "asterisk" 
footnote stated: "I understand that I may have to provide 
medical evidence of insurability before this coverage 
becomes effective." Mr. Daniels placed an "X" in the blank 
next to "None." 
 
In her deposition, Mrs. Daniels testified to statements Mr. 
Daniels made after the December 20 meeting that tended to 
show what he thought he had done with respect to his 
supplemental life insurance. Mrs. Daniels testified that 
after the terminal nature of her husband's condition 
became known in January, 1993, he told her "four or five 
times" that she would receive 2.5 times his salary in life 
insurance benefits. She further testified that subsequent to 
the new benefits plan becoming effective, her husband 
reviewed his payroll deductions for a supplemental life 
insurance entry and, finding one, told her that"it was in 
order."1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Mr. Daniels' January 14, 1993, pay statement showed an insurance 
deduction in the same amount as his prior statements. His February 11, 
1993, pay statement appears to contain a $50.97 insurance deduction; 
that amount is listed under the heading "Deduction Type." Despite this 
entry's appearance, it is in fact a credit. The pay statement itself 
contains no visible indicia that this entry, listed as it is below the 
heading "Deduction Type" and next to other, true deductions, is in fact 
a credit. One only discovers that this entry is in fact a credit if one 
takes 
Mr. Daniels' February 11, 1993, gross pay and actually calculates his 
net pay. Mr. Daniels' March 15, 1993, pay statement, issued four days 
after his death, shows no deduction for supplemental insurance. 
 
T&B explains that because it had not implemented all of the MetLife 
benefits changes as of Mr. Daniels' January 14, 1993, paycheck, it 
erroneously deducted $20.54 for supplemental life insurance. Although 
T&B is correct that the February 13, 1993, entry is in fact a credit and 
not a deduction, it points to no record evidence to support its 
explanation of what necessitated this pay adjustment. 
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After Mr. Daniels' death, Mrs. Daniels received payment 
of $53,000, representing one times her husband's annual 
salary. Mr. Daniels' son, Charles, Jr., asked Schierer if the 
family was entitled to any additional life insurance benefits 
in light of the supplemental life insurance his father had 
been electing. Schierer produced the form on which Mr. 
Daniels had marked "None" and informed the Daniels that 
there were no additional life insurance benefits. Mrs. 
Daniels then obtained counsel who, on September 29, 
1994, wrote to T&B and requested "all benefit plan 
document [sic] or plan summaries which explain any and 
all plan terms, benefits, and procedures applicable to 
benefits available to Mr. Daniels." T&B did not respond to 
Mrs. Daniels' attorney's request until July 17, 1995, 291 
days later. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court held that T&B, as the administrator of 
an ERISA plan, had a fiduciary duty not to "materially 
mislead those to whom the duty of loyalty and prudence are 
owed." App. at 16 (quoting from In re Unisys Corp. Retiree 
Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 57 F.3d 1255, 1261 (3d Cir. 
1995)). A misrepresentation, it explained, is material if 
"there is substantial likelihood that it would mislead a 
reasonable employee into making" a decision to his or her 
detriment. Id. T&B does not dispute that it had a fiduciary 
duty; it does dispute that it breached that duty. 
 
The District Court concluded that T&B made a material 
misrepresentation to Mr. Daniels. As the Court succinctly 
put it: 
 
        The Court concludes that defendants made a 
       material misrepresentation to Mr. Daniels when they 
       stated in documents sent to him to explain the change 
       in benefits: "If you currently have supplemental 
       coverage, you will be grandfathered up to your current 
       coverage amount." (Esposito Cert., Exh. F). Black's Law 
       Dictionary defines "grandfather clause," in relevant 
       part, as: "Provision in a new law or regulation 
       exempting those already in or a part of the existing 
       system which is being regulated." (Id.) On its face, 
 
                                6 
  
       defendants' statement conveyed that employees who 
       already had supplemental insurance coverage would be 
       exempted from the changes to defendants' policy. 
 
       * * * 
 
        There is no elaboration on this grandfather clause 
       anywhere in the remainder of the explanatory 
       memorandum where that sentence is found or in the 
       other information defendants provided to Mr. Daniels, 
       i.e., the cover memorandum, the enrollment form, and 
       the information Mr. Schierer says he conveyed to Mr. 
       Daniels at the December 20, 1992 meeting. 
 
       * * * 
 
        Defendants' statement that "[i]f you currently have 
       supplemental coverage, you will be grandfathered up to 
       your current coverage amount" was a material 
       misrepresentation. (Esposito Cert., Exh. F). In fact, 
       employees who already had supplemental insurance 
       were not grandfathered up to their current coverage 
       amounts. Instead, they had to elect to be 
       grandfathered up to those amounts . . . . 
 
App. at 17, 17-18, 18. 
 
In the District Court's view, this finding of a material 
misrepresentation by an ERISA fiduciary was sufficient 
alone to warrant summary judgment against T&B "as to 
[its] liability." App. at 36. The Court made no finding as to 
whether Mr. Daniels actually relied on T&B's 
misrepresentation. Instead, it concluded that "genuine 
issues of material fact remain as to the type of equitable 
relief that should be awarded." In the course of so 
concluding, the District Court acknowledged that Mr. 
Daniels may not have relied upon the misrepresentation at 
all; instead, Mr. Daniels may have "purposely elected not to 
continue to pay for supplemental insurance." On the other 
hand, the Court observed, the evidence would support an 
inference that the "grandfathered" misrepresentation led 
Mr. Daniels to believe that he did not have to do anything 
to continue his existing supplemental insurance and that 
he should check "None" on the enrollment form to indicate 
that he did not wish to purchase any additional 
supplemental insurance. 
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The arbitrator explicitly acknowledged that the District 
Court had yet to find reliance: "This case boils down to the 
following questions. Did the grandfather clause cause the 
decline of the supplemental plan under the new policy and 
if so what is the remedy?" Having recognized the unresolved 
reliance issue, the arbitrator stated cursorily,"Considering 
the pros and cons of each party's argument makes[this] a 
case which should be decided equitably." The arbitrator 
then summarily awarded Mrs. Daniels $40,545 (or fifty-one 
percent of her desired recovery) plus costs. 
 
With respect to appellees' claim that T&B violated 29 
U.S.C. S 1024(b)(4) by refusing to comply with a request for 
the "instruments under which [an ERISA] plan is 
established or operated," the District Court held that: (1) a 
request from the attorney of a participant or beneficiary 
triggers the statutory duty to respond; and (2) Mrs. Daniels 
was a "beneficiary" as defined in ERISA at the time of her 
attorney's request even though she had previously received 
all of the insurance proceeds she was entitled to receive 
under the MetLife Plan. The District Court then noted that 
T&B had offered no excuses for its failure to provide the 
documents other than the legal arguments the Court had 
just rejected and pointed out that there had not even been 
a response to Mrs. Daniels asserting these legal positions. 
As a result, it imposed penalties of $100 per day for the 
291 days T&B had refused to respond.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 
29 U.S.C. S 1132(f). 
 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291. We reject 
Mrs. Daniels' argument that 28 U.S.C. S 657(a) deprives this court of 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Section 657(a) provides that arbitration 
awards made under Chapter 44 of Title 28 "shall be entered as the 
judgment of the court after the time [30 days] has expired for requesting 
a trial de novo. The judgment so entered shall be subject to the same 
provisions of law and shall have the same force and effect as a judgment 
of the court in a civil action, except that the judgment shall not be 
subject 
to review in any other court by appeal or otherwise ." (emphasis added). 
The arbitrator's award was entered on November 8, 1999, and T&B filed 
its demand for a trial de novo twenty-nine days later on December 7, 
1999. In its notice demanding trial de novo, T&B stated that it only 
wished to preserve its right to challenge the District Court's liability 
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III. 
 
Both sides claim to be entitled to summary judgment 
with respect to T&B's liability on the breach of fiduciary 
duty claim. Moreover, T&B insists that, even if it is not 
entitled to such a summary judgment, the issue of liability 
must be tried. In order to resolve these contentions and the 
arguments addressed in support of them, we must 
determine: (1) whether there is a material dispute of fact as 
to whether T&B made a material misrepresentation; (2) 
whether detrimental reliance is an essential element of Mrs. 
Daniels' case on liability and, if so, whether there is a 
material dispute of fact as to whether Mr. Daniels relied on 
the "grandfathered" statement; and (3) whether summary 
judgment could properly be entered against T&B on the 
liability issue in the alleged absence of any evidence 
tending to show that it was aware of confusion on Mr. 
Daniels' part. 
 
Mrs. Daniels' claim is that T&B breached its fiduciary 
duty by misrepresenting that existing supplemental 
insurance would be "grandfathered." We have reviewed the 
elements of such a claim in two recent decisions, Adams v. 
Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475 (3d Cir. 2000), and In 
re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit "ERISA" Litigation, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
determinations on both the breach of fiduciary duty and S 1024(b)(4) 
claims. T&B stipulated that "[t]o the extent . . . that the arbitration 
award determined only the amount of the remedy to be awarded to [Mrs. 
Daniels], . . . [T&B] do[es] not demand trial de novo and will accept 
$40,545 as a reasonable calculation of the remedy, subject to [T&B's] 
right to appeal the underlying issues of liability." 
 
We have some question as to whether S 657(a) or Local Civil Rule 
201.1 (the authority the arbitrator purported to exercise) can be read to 
authorize referral to arbitration of an issue , as opposed to an action or 
a claim. We need not determine that issue, however, because even if 
those provisions are understood to authorize such a referral, they should 
not be read to bar appellate review of issues that were adjudicated by the 
court and not by the arbitrator. At least where a party makes it clear, as 
did T&B, that it intends to preserve its right to appeal issues resolved 
by 
the court, neither Section 657(a) nor Local Civil Rule 201.1 precludes 
our exercise of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 to review issues that 
were not resolved by the arbitrator. 
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242 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Unisys III]. In 
Adams, we stated: 
 
        An employee may recover for a breach of fiduciary 
       duty [under ERISA] if he or she proves that any 
       employer, acting as a fiduciary, made a material 
       misrepresentation that would confuse a reasonable 
       beneficiary about his or her benefits, and the 
       beneficiary acted thereupon to his or her detriment. 
 
Id. at 492; see also Unisys III, 242 F.3d at 505 (quoting 
Adams and noting that it elucidates "the elements of a 
breach of fiduciary claim"). Following Adams  and Unisys III, 
it is thus clear that, in order to make out a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim of the kind here asserted, a plaintiff 
must establish each of the following elements: (1) the 
defendant's status as an ERISA fiduciary acting as a 
fiduciary; (2) a misrepresentation on the part of the 
defendant; (3) the materiality of that misrepresentation; and 
(4) detrimental reliance by the plaintiff on the 
misrepresentation. 
 
Like the District Court here, we explained in Adams that 
a misrepresentation is material if there is a substantial 
likelihood that it would mislead a reasonable employee in 
making a decision regarding his benefits under the ERISA 
plan. See id. "Summary judgment on the`question of 
materiality' is appropriate only if `reasonable minds cannot 
differ.' " Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (quoting from TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 
426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976)). 
 
A. Material Misrepresentation 
 
The portion of T&B's explanatory materials on which Mrs. 
Daniels primarily bases her case is set forth again in the 
margin for the reader's convenience.3 Mrs. Daniels 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.   If you currently have supplemental coverage, you will be 
       grandfathered up to your current amount. If your current coverage 
       amount is less than 5 times base salary, you then have the option 
       of electing an additional 1 times base salary up to an incremental 
       $100,000 without additional proof of insurability. 
 
        Employees who do not currently have supplemental coverage will 
       be guaranteed coverage for 2 times base salary up to $200,000. 
       Proof of insurability will be required for the additional coverage 
       chosen in excess of 2 times. 
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emphasizes that this portion advises someone in Mr. 
Daniels' position that his existing supplemental coverage 
"will be grandfathered up to your current amount." This 
clearly connotes, in her view, that existing supplemental 
insurance would continue unaffected by the new plan and 
that it would do so without further action on the part of the 
employee. While she acknowledges that this advice is 
followed by information about proof of insurability, she 
points out that everything following the first sentence 
expressly refers only to "additional" supplemental coverage 
or to "employees who do not currently have supplemental 
coverage." She insists that the notion that no action was 
required on the part of an employee who wished to continue 
only existing coverage was confirmed by the fact that the 
election form signed by Mr. Daniels provided an 
opportunity to elect coverage of only 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 times 
earnings but provided no way to elect continuation of 
coverage of 1.5, 2.5, 3.5 or 4.5 times earnings. This aspect 
of the form clearly suggested that its purpose was to 
provide an opportunity to purchase supplemental 
insurance in "addition" to existing coverage, a suggestion 
that is supported by the footnote indicating that, whichever 
election was made, it might be subject to proof of 
insurability. 
 
T&B counters by insisting that, in the context of its 
material as a whole, there was no significant risk that a 
reasonable employee would receive the understanding for 
which Mrs. Daniels contends. It emphasizes that under the 
old program, as well as the new, the "Basic Life Insurance" 
provided at T&B's expense was the only thing that was 
automatic and that supplemental insurance at the 
employee's expense had to be elected annually by him or 
her. It points out that Mr. Schierer's covering letter, which 
explains supplemental coverage and its cost to the 
employee, begins by stating, "It is once again time to make 
your Benefit Choices for 1993. Please note that you will 
have the following choices effective 1/1/93." App. at 56. 
T&B further notes that in the accompanying materials, the 
Basic Life Insurance is the only thing described as 
"automatic," and supplemental coverage is consistently 
described as elective.4 The term"grandfathered" appears 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. "You are automatically covered for Basic Life Insurance . . . . You are 
also eligible to purchase Supplemental Life Insurance . . . ." App. at 59. 
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only once in this overall general context of elective 
supplemental coverage and then only in the specific context 
of proof of insurability. As a result, T&B argues that no 
reasonable employee was likely to conclude from its 
materials that supplemental insurance under the old 
program was being imposed on employees at their own 
expense with no opportunity provided on the form for 
opting out. The reasonable inference to be drawn from the 
materials, T&B insists, is that "grandfathered" referred to a 
right to elect to continue existing coverage without proof of 
insurability and that the only opportunities available for 
supplemental coverage were those provided for on the form, 
with those employees who had existing supplemental 
coverage being entitled to elect supplemental coverage 
without proof of insurability not to exceed existing 
supplemental coverage, i.e., in Mr. Daniels' case, 1 times 
earnings, since 2 times earnings would exceed his existing 
supplemental coverage of 1.5 times earnings. 
 
We conclude that the message conveyed by the materials 
as a whole is a matter about which reasonable minds could 
differ. Accordingly, we conclude that summary judgment 
was entered contrary to the teachings of Fischer . 
 
B. Detrimental Reliance 
 
Mrs. Daniels claims that she is in a worse position than 
she would have been in if T&B had not made its 
"grandfathered" statement and seeks relief on that basis. 
Consistent with the above discussion of the elements of 
such a breach of fiduciary duty claim and contrary to the 
conclusion of the District Court here, she is not entitled to 
relief unless she can establish that her failure to receive 
more than $53,000 was attributable to Mr. Daniels' reliance 
on the alleged misrepresentation, i.e., that he wished his 
1.5 times earnings coverage to continue and failed to 
effectuate that wish because he was misled by T&B's 
"grandfathered" statement. See also Unisys III, 242 F.3d at 
505. It necessarily follows that the District Court erred in 
entering summary judgment against T&B on the issue of its 
liability for breach of fiduciary duty without the required 
finding of uncontroverted evidence of detrimental reliance. 
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T&B asks that we remand with instructions to enter 
summary judgment in its favor because there is no 
competent evidence from which a trier of fact could find 
detrimental reliance by Mr. Daniels. Finding that there is a 
material dispute of fact on this issue, we decline to so 
instruct the District Court. 
 
We believe that a trier of fact, having concluded that 
T&B's grandfathering statement held a substantial risk of 
misleading one in Mr. Daniels' position, could infer from 
this record that he intended for his supplemental insurance 
to continue and failed to effectuate that intent because the 
grandfathering statement led him to check "None" on the 
form and to take no other steps to elect new supplemental 
coverage under the MetLife plan. Mrs. Daniels' testimony 
that her husband assured her in January of 1993 that he 
had coverage amounting to 2.5 times earnings and that the 
deduction from his pay for supplemental insurance was in 
order would clearly support the conclusion that he desired 
to have his supplemental coverage continue and that he 
believed it was continuing. This could be viewed as 
consistent with his having checked "None" only if he 
mistakenly believed that the election form was directed to 
additional supplemental insurance and that continuing 
existing coverage required no further action on his part. 
Since this mistaken belief is precisely the risk that the trier 
of fact would have previously found inherent in T&B's 
"grandfathered" statement, a conclusion of a causal 
connection between the two could naturally follow. 
 
On the other hand, a conclusion of detrimental reliance 
is not mandated by this record. It would also support an 
inference that Mr. Daniels, facing a period of 
unemployment, wanted to reduce the deductions from his 
pay and checked "None" in order to accomplish that 
objective. 
 
C. T&B's Knowledge of Confusion 
 
T&B insists that it can have no liability for a breach of 
fiduciary duty in the absence of evidence of knowledge on 
its part "that Mr. Daniels was confused when he declined to 
purchase supplemental life insurance." Appellants' Br. at 
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14. Finding no such evidence, T&B urges us to direct the 
entry of summary judgment in its favor. 
 
Again, as the above discussion of the elements of Mrs. 
Daniels' breach of fiduciary duty claim indicates, if an 
employee proves that an employer, acting as a fiduciary, 
made an inaccurate statement holding a substantial 
likelihood of misleading a reasonable employee into making 
a harmful decision regarding benefits, and that he relied to 
his detriment on that statement in making such a decision, 
the employee is entitled to equitable relief. If the statement 
creates a substantial risk of misleading a reasonable 
employee, it is foreseeable that an employee will be misled 
to his detriment. That foreseeability and reasonable reliance 
by a beneficiary are all that is required. See Unisys III, 242 
F.3d at 507-10. In such circumstances, we have never 
required a showing that the employer had actual knowledge 
that a particular employee was about to be misled. 
 
As we noted in Unisys III, there are situations in which 
the employer's knowledge of an employee's knowledge and 
understanding is important to the liability issue. Most 
frequent are those situations in which an employer has not 
affirmatively misled the employee but has failed to provide 
the employee information which the employer knows the 
employee needs in order to protect himself from harm. See 
Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 
F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding a fiduciary duty on 
the part of an employer to communicate to the beneficiary 
material facts affecting the interest of the beneficiary which 
the employer knows the beneficiary does not know and 
which the beneficiary needs to know for his protection). In 
such a situation, harm to the beneficiary may not be 
reasonably foreseeable in the absence of employer 
knowledge of the employee's knowledge and understanding. 
See Unisys III, 242 F.3d at 509. Where the fiduciary makes 
an affirmative statement that creates a substantial 
likelihood of injury to a reasonable beneficiary, however, 
any harm occasioned by the detrimental reliance on the 
affirmative misrepresentation is foreseeable and gives rise 
to liability. 
 
Contrary to T&B's suggestion, neither International Union, 
United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement 
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Workers, U.A.W. v. Skinner Engine Company, 188 F.3d 130 
(3d Cir. 1999), nor In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical 
Benefit "ERISA" Litigation, 57 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1995) 
[hereinafter Unisys II], holds that knowledge of employee 
confusion is an element of a breach of fiduciary duty claim 
like that made by Mrs. Daniels. Those cases, like Bixler, 
involved situations in which the plan administrator 
allegedly failed to provide complete and adequate 
information when it knew that such information was 
necessary to avoid harm to beneficiaries. The portions of 
the opinions in those cases to which T&B directs our 
attention do not involve claims of affirmative 
misrepresentation. See, e.g., Skinner , 188 F.3d at 150 
("[T]here is no competent evidence which suggests that the 
company made any affirmative misrepresentations 
concerning the duration of retiree benefits."); id. at 148, 
150 (characterizing the plaintiffs as arguing that the 
defendant breached its fiduciary duty "by failing to inform 
them that the CBAs did not provide lifetime welfare 
benefits" and "by failing to correct the retirees' mistaken 
belief ") (emphasis added); Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 1265 n.15, 
1266 ("[W]e hold that the district court did not err as a 
matter of law in concluding that the duty to convey 
complete and accurate information that was material to its 
employees' circumstance arose from these facts since the 
trustees had to know that their silence might cause 
harm."). 
 
IV. 
 
Section 1024(b)(4) of Title 29 provides in relevant part 
that "[t]he administrator shall, upon written request of any 
participant or beneficiary, furnish a copy of the . . . 
instruments under which the plan is established or 
operated." T&B insists that the judgment entered by the 
District Court against it must be reversed because (1) a 
written request from an attorney purporting to represent a 
participant or beneficiary does not trigger the duty to 
respond unless it is accompanied by written authorization 
from the client; (2) Mrs. Daniels was not a "beneficiary," as 
that term is used in ERISA; and (3) the amount of the 
penalty imposed constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
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A. Sufficiency of the Request 
 
As we noted in Bruch v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 
828 F.2d 134, 153 (3d Cir. 1987), "ERISA's legislative 
history makes clear that Congress intended the 
information-producing provisions to enable claimants to 
make their own decisions on how best to enforce their 
rights." We conclude that this objective will be best served 
by a rule that a representation by an attorney that he is 
making a request on behalf of a participant or beneficiary 
triggers the duty to respond under S 1024(b)(4) when the 
administrator has no reason to question the attorney's 
authority. In the rare case where the administrator has 
reason to question that authority, it can respond by 
requesting further evidence. The objective of the statute 
would be ill served, however, by permitting administrators 
to refuse to respond with no indication that authority is 
even an issue. We believe the facts of this case forcefully 
compel that conclusion. 
 
T&B has asked that we defer to the interpretation of 
S 1024(b)(4) that it finds in the Department of Labor's 
Advisory Opinion Letter 82-021A. That letter addressed a 
request for documents by a non-attorney third party. In 
that context, the Department gave the following advice: 
 
       [I]f information is required to be furnished to a 
       participant or beneficiary under section 104(b)(4)[29 
       U.S.C. S 1024(b)(4)], the information must also be 
       furnished to a third party where the participant or 
       beneficiary has authorized in writing the release of the 
       information to such third party. Absent such 
       authorization, it is the Department's view that a plan is 
       not required by section 104 of ERISA to provide such 
       information to persons who are neither participants 
       nor beneficiaries. 
 
See Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp., 29 F.3d 1062, 1072 (6th Cir. 
1994). While we agree with this advice as applied to non- 
attorney third parties, we believe an attorney's 
representation regarding the authority conferred upon him 
or her by the client adds a material factor not present in 
the situation the Department was addressing. The law has 
traditionally accepted such representations in the absence 
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of reason to question them,5 and the statutory objective 
behind S 1024(b)(4) counsels in favor of accepting them 
here. For this reason, we respectfully disagree with the 
conclusion reached by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Bartling. See Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1503-04 (10th 
Cir. 1994) (recognizing an attorney's letter similar in all 
material respects to that of Mrs. Daniels' attorney as 
constituting a "request" under the statute and triggering a 
duty to respond). 
 
B. "Beneficiary" 
 
Even if a letter from a lawyer on behalf of a beneficiary is 
sufficient to implicate S 1024(b)(4), the attorney must still 
write on behalf of either a "participant" or a"beneficiary." 
Mr. Daniels, not Mrs. Daniels, was the participant; to 
invoke the protection of S 1024(b)(4), Mrs. Daniels, then, 
must be a beneficiary. 
 
Section 1002(8) of Title 29 defines an ERISA "beneficiary" 
as "a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of 
an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to 
a benefit thereunder." This requires that we resolve two 
issues: (1) what constitutes a relevant "benefit"?; and (2) 
when does an individual making a request for plan 
documents qualify as "a person . . . who is or may become 
entitled" to such a benefit?6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See Graves v. United States Coast Guard , 692 F.2d 71, 74 (9th Cir. 
1982) ("The designation `attorney for Leonard Graves' [on an 
administrative Tort Claims Act claim] is particularly important in view of 
the body of case law holding that the appearance of an attorney for a 
party raises a presumption that the attorney has the authority to act on 
that party's behalf.") See also Anderson v. Flexel, Inc., 47 F.3d 243, 249 
(7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing in the context of an attorney's request under 
S 1024(b)(4) "the existence of the long-standing legal presumption that an 
attorney has authority to act on behalf of the person he" purports to 
represent). 
6. Mrs. Daniels brought her breach of fiduciary duty claim under 29 
U.S.C. S 1132(a)(3) which provides in part that a "civil action may be 
brought . . . by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary . . . to obtain . 
. . 
appropriate equitable relief . . . to redress . . . violations" of ERISA. 
T&B 
does not contend that Mrs. Daniels fails to qualify as a beneficiary under 
this section, and we thus have no occasion to address the relationship 
between it and section 1002(8). 
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With regard to the first of these two questions, the 
specific relief that Mrs. Daniels seeks in the instant case-- 
damages stemming from T&B's alleged breach of fiduciary 
duty--does not constitute a "benefit" within the meaning of 
S 1002(8). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals came to this 
same conclusion in Kuntz v. Reese, 785 F.2d 1410, 1411 
(9th Cir. 1986), in which the court observed: "The . . . 
plaintiffs do not allege that their vested benefits were 
improperly computed, rather they allege breach of fiduciary 
duty or of a duty to disclose information about benefits, 
thus any recoverable damages would not be benefits from 
the plan." 
 
Consequently, if we were to assess "beneficiary" status as 
of the time of the present appeal, Mrs. Daniels would not be 
a "beneficiary" and, therefore, would not be entitled to lodge 
a request for plan documents to which T&B would be 
legally obligated to respond. As of the time of the present 
appeal, Mrs. Daniels presses only a claim for damages 
stemming from T&B's alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Any 
recovery Mrs. Daniels would receive as a consequence of 
the present cause of action for fiduciary breach would come 
out of T&B's pocket (i.e., on the theory that T&B made 
materially misleading statements about the plan), and not 
out of MetLife's (i.e., on the theory that the plan's 
provisions entitle Mrs. Daniels to payment pursuant to its 
terms). 
 
We conclude, however, that ERISA beneficiary status 
should not be measured as of the time of the present 
appeal. Instead, the temporal focus of the "beneficiary" 
inquiry should be the time the request for plan documents 
was made. An individual who "is . . . entitled" to a plan 
benefit or who "may become entitled" to such a benefit, as 
of the time that individual makes the request of the plan 
administrator, thus constitutes a "beneficiary." 
 
As of the time of her request, Mrs. Daniels had no reason 
to believe that events would happen in the future which 
would entitle her to a benefit, i.e., that she would "become 
entitled" at some future date. The issue for decision is thus 
narrowed to whether Mrs. Daniels was "entitled" to a plan 
benefit on September 29, 1994, when her request for 
documents was made. In order for her to be "entitled," it is 
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not necessary that she establish that she had a meritorious 
claim; it is sufficient if she demonstrates that she had a 
"colorable claim that . . . she will prevail in a suit for 
benefits." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 
101, 117 (1989). We conclude that she had such a claim. 
 
As we have recounted, Mrs. Daniels had been told by her 
husband shortly before his death that he had life insurance 
through his employer's plan in the amount of 2.5 times his 
annual salary. He was in a position to have personal 
knowledge of this matter and had an interest in accurately 
advising her regarding it. As of September 29th, Mrs. 
Daniels knew she had received materially less than 2.5 
times Mr. Daniels' salary in insurance proceeds. While her 
son had been shown the group insurance election form, its 
significance could not be reliably assessed in isolation. With 
this knowledge, we conclude that Mrs. Daniels had a 
colorable claim to additional insurance proceeds and that 
Congress intended that she have access to the documents 
necessary to determine whether she had a meritorious 
claim as well as a colorable one. The concept of a colorable 
claim necessarily encompasses situations in which the 
requester has a reasonable basis for believing that he or 
she has a meritorious claim but is in fact mistaken. If Mrs. 
Daniels' situation on September 29th were not one of these, 
we would have difficulty hypothesizing one. 
 
It is true, as T&B stresses, that the letter of Mrs. Daniels' 
attorney was consistent with her contemplating a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim.7 We do not believe, however, that one 
in Mrs. Daniels' position should be held to have made an 
election of remedies based on the precise wording of a letter 
seeking access to the information necessary to make an 
informed decision regarding available remedies. If an 
administrator has concerns about whether someone 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. One paragraph of the letter reads as follows: 
 
        We are representing the family on their claims for damages 
       concerning the actions of Thomas & Betts, and its employees, 
       resulting in the denial of life insurance benefit payments on life 
       insurance benefits that were provided to Mr. Daniels prior to his 
       death. 
 
App. at 69. 
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requesting access lacks a colorable claim, it is free to ask 
for the facts upon which a claim to a benefit is being made. 
If, like T&B, it fails to do so, it proceeds at its own risk. 
 
C. The Penalty 
 
Section 1132(c) provides that, in the court's discretion, a 
plan administrator may be required to pay a beneficiary 
penalties of up to $100 per day from the date of the 
administrator's failure "to comply with a request for . . . 
information . . . by mailing the material requested . . . 
within 30 days . . . ." The District Court imposed the 
maximum fine because T&B had refused to respond in any 
way over a very extended period of time and offered no 
explanation whatsoever for that refusal. As the Court noted, 
there was no indication that T&B's refusal was "some sort 
of administrative mistake," and the Court found it difficult 
to accept that T&B acted based on the legal arguments 
advanced here without giving any indication of its position 
to Mrs. Daniels' attorney. T&B characterizes the District 
Court's findings in this regard as findings of an absence of 
bad faith and, on that basis, insists that the maximum fine 
was an abuse of discretion. While we believe T&B's conduct 
fell something short of a good faith effort at compliance, it 
is not necessary for us to so characterize it. Suffice it to say 
that the reasons identified by the District Court are 
sufficient to bring its ultimate conclusion well within the 
scope of its considerable discretion. 
 
We will, however, direct that, on remand, the penalty be 
reduced by $3,000. The District Court found that T&B 
withheld plan documents for 291 days, from September 29, 
1994, until July 17, 1995. Section 1132(c) directs that the 
fine commence "from the date of such failure or refusal" to 
provide the requested documents. Section 1132(c) 
characterizes the relevant "failure" as the failure to provide 
the documents within 30 days of the participant's or 
beneficiary's request. Effectively, there is a 30 day grace 
period in S 1132(c) before the "failure" to provide the 
documents begins. Thus, although T&B produced the 
documents 291 days after Mrs. Daniels' request, this is a 
"failure" to produce the documents for 261 days. Thus, the 
maximum penalty would be $26,100, not $29,100. See 
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Bartling v. Freuhauf Corp., 29 F.3d 1062, 1069 (6th Cir. 
1994). 
 
V. 
 
Having found that T&B breached its fiduciary duty to Mr. 
Daniels and that it improperly withheld plan documents 
from Mrs. Daniels, the District Court awarded Mrs. Daniels 
attorney's fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. S 1132(g).8 Because 
we have concluded that we must reverse the District 
Court's grant of Mrs. Daniels' motion for summary 
judgment as to her breach of fiduciary duty claim, we must 
also vacate the District Court's imposition of attorney's fees. 
After Mrs. Daniels' breach of fiduciary duty claim is finally 
resolved, the District Court may, of course, revisit the 
attorney's fee issue. 
 
VI. 
 
Because genuine issues of material fact exist as to 
whether T&B's "grandfathered" statement is materially 
misleading and, if it was, as to whether Mr. Daniels relied 
on it in making his supplemental insurance election, we 
will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Section 1132(g) provides as follows: "(1) In any action under this 
subchapter (other than an action described in paragraph (2) [delinquent 
contributions]) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in 
its 
discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to 
either party." 
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